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NOTES
ALLIED TUBE & CONDUIT CORP. v.
INDIAN HEAD, INC.: AN EMERGING
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CLAIMS OF NOERR IMMUNITY*
Since its decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc." the Supreme Court has made it clear that
no violation of the Sherman Act 2 can be predicated solely on efforts "to
persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with
respect to a law that would produce a restraint [of trade] or a monop-
oly."' The source and scope of this area of antitrust "immunity, '4 how-
ever, has never been clear. In the decade after Noerr the Supreme
Court decided two more cases bearing directly on antitrust liability for
petitioning the government. 5 Neither case clarified the source and
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dr. Gregory B. Adams,
Associate Professor of Law at the University of South Carolina, for his comments and
suggestions in the preparation of this note.
1. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
3. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
4. The term "immunity" may be a misnomer. At various times the Supreme Court
has suggested that the Noerr doctrine is based on a construction of the Sherman Act.
See id. at 132 n.6. On other occasions it has suggested that Noerr is rooted in the first
amendment's guarantees of association and petition. See California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972). If Noerr is based on a construction of
the Sherman Act, then the doctrine is not one of antitrust "immunity" because the activ-
ity it protects cannot properly be labeled a restraint of trade. If, however, the doctrine is
required by the first amendment, then "immunity" might be an appropriate label, since
the Constitution would prevent the Sherman Act from reaching some purportedly pro-
hibited activity. Whatever the source of the Noerr doctrine, the term "immunity" is used
throughout this Note merely for simplicity.
5. See California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. 508; United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The Court has mentioned the Noerr doctrine in other anti-
trust cases, but the Noerr issue either was not decided, see Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 53 n.11 (1985), or was not the central
1
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scope of Noerr's protections. In fact, the subsequent cases arguably
clouded an already uncertain legal doctrine. To compound the prob-
lem, the Court began a prolonged silence with regard to claims of No-
err immunity. This reticence left the lower federal courts to roam at
large in a field of antitrust immunity. The results were perhaps pre-
dictable: the lower courts varied in application of the doctrine and its
exceptions and even crafted additional exceptions.'
issue in the case. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 635 n.6 (1977)
(Anti-Injunction Act bars enjoining state court suit alleged to violate antitrust laws);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 601 (1976) (principal issue was state action
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
6. The principal exception to the Noerr doctrine is the so-called sham exception.
First suggested by dicta in the Noerr opinion itself, 365 U.S. at 144, the sham exception
blossomed in California Motor Transport. In that case the Court held that a complaint
alleging that a competitor had instituted "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" before
state and federal regulatory agencies for the purpose of preventing a rival trucking com-
pany from obtaining or transferring operating rights stated an antitrust claim under the
sham exception. Id. at 512-13. Nevertheless, the scope of the sham exception has fos-
tered significant debate among the courts and commentators. For a more thorough dis-
cussion, see infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text and notes 210-30 and accompany-
ing text.
Other exceptions have also been fashioned based on dictum in Supreme Court opin-
ions. For example, some courts have suggested that Noerr may not protect petitioning
activity when the government agency is a co-conspirator in the antitrust violation. See,
e.g., California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513 ("Conspiracy with a licensing authority
to eliminate a competitor may also result in an antitrust transgression."); Pennington,
381 U.S. at 671 (Secretary of Labor "not claimed to be a co-conspirator" in antitrust
conspiracy allegedly formed by mine operators and union); Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v.
Joor Mfg., 827 F.2d 458, 466 (9th Cir. 1987) (dictum stating that Noerr immunity does
not "extend to private parties who have entered into a 'conspiracy' with governmental
actors"), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2862 (1988) (remanded for further consideration in light of
Allied Tube Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988)); Clipper Exxpress
v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1252 n.17 (9th Cir. 1982)
(conspiracy with licensing authority to eliminate competition not protected by Noerr)
(citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962)),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir.
1975) (Noerr does not apply to "official participation with private individuals in a
scheme to restrain trade"); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.
1964) (Noerr might not apply if public official participates in antitrust conspiracy). But
see Boone v. Redevelopment Agency, 841 F.2d 886, 897 (9th Cir.) (repudiating Harman
and citing Pennington for the proposition that no co-conspirator exception to Noerr doc-
trine exists), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 489 (1988); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford,
Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975) (co-conspirator exception would abrogate Noerr
doctrine).
The lower courts have also suggested a commercial activity exception to the Noerr
doctrine. This exception precludes Noerr immunity when the government acts solely in a
commercial capacity, generally as a purchaser of goods or services. See, e.g., George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 850 (1970); cf. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990)
(condemning restraint imposed on governmental purchases of legal services). But see In
[Vol. 41
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CLAIMS OF NOERR IMMUNITY
The Court's 1988 decision in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. In-
dian Head, Inc.,7 the first to consider Noerr in sixteen years, has begun
the process of clarification. Although its contours are not clear, Allied
Tube outlines a basic framework for analyzing claims of Noerr immu-
nity. Under Allied Tube, antitrust immunity for acts of petitioning the
government may be either absolute or qualified. Absolute immunity ex-
tends to acts of petitioning that result in restraints of trade imposed by
governmental action." Qualified immunity extends to acts of petition-
ing that result in restraints of trade imposed by private parties if those
restraints are incidental to valid and genuine efforts to influence gov-
ernmental action.9 Qualified immunity varies with the "context and na-
ture" of the petitioning activity.'0 This Note examines the conceptual
framework for claims of Noerr immunity emerging from Allied Tube,
with a view toward solving some of the uncertainties remaining after
that decision." To understand the Allied Tube case itself, however, a
basic knowledge of the Noerr doctrine as it had developed in the Su-
preme Court's prior opinions is necessary.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOERR DOCTRINE
A. Noerr and Pennington
The Noerr doctrine grew out of a "'no-holds-barred fight' "12 be-
tween groups of railroads and trucking companies who competed in
hauling heavy freight. The railroads had undertaken a publicity cam-
paign, directed at the public at large, allegedly "designed to foster the
adoption and retention of laws and law enforcement practices destruc-
tive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for
the truckers among the general public, and to impair the relationships
existing between the truckers and their customers." 13 Through various
re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting commer-
cial activity exception), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983). The existence and application
of these exceptions to the Noerr doctrine are beyond the scope of this Note.
7. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
8. Id. at 498.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. This Note focuses on what might be called the typical Noerr claim. In such cases
the antitrust plaintiff alleges that certain of the defendant's activities in seeking govern-
mental action have caused him competitive injury. The defendant raises Noerr as a de-
fense. The plaintiff then asserts that the conduct is either not protected by Noerr or
amounts to a form of sham petitioning.
12. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
144 (1961).
13. Id. at 129.
1990]
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speeches and written materials, the railroads attempted to sway public
opinion by charging that heavy trucks posed certain traffic hazards and
did a disproportionate share of damage to the nation's highways. 1 4 The
railroads, however, did not disclose their involvement in the campaign.
Instead, they used the "third-party technique," an advertising ploy
which made the views expressed appear to be those of independent
persons and groups even though they were actually prepared by the
railroads. 15 These efforts were apparently successful, obtaining stricter
enforcement of traffic laws against truckers and a gubernatorial veto of
a Pennsylvania bill that would have permitted trucks to carry heavier
loads in that state.'6 The truckers filed an antitrust action and ob-
tained a judgment in the district court. 17 A divided Third Circuit panel
affirmed."'
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. 19 The Court be-
gan with the premise that "no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforce-
ment of laws.' 20 The rule extended, it said, to petitioning "with respect
to a law that would produce a restraint or monopoly"' and encom-
passed the railroads' publicity campaign.2
2
The decision rested on three points. First, the publicity campaign
bore "little if any resemblance to the combinations normally held vio-
lative of the Sherman Act,' 2 3 combinations characterized by agree-
ments among competitors to fix prices, divide markets, or boycott re-
calcitrant suppliers or customers. 24 Second, if efforts to influence
government fell within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act, "the
power of government to take actions through its legislature and execu-
tive that operate to restrain trade" would be impaired. 2 Since repre-
sentative democracy depends upon the ability of persons to communi-
cate with their elected officials, the Court refused to "impute to the
Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political
14. Id. at 130-31.
15. Id. at 129-30.
16. Id. at 130.
17. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp.
768 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959) (per curiam), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
18. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d 218
(3d Cir. 1959) (per curiam), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
19. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
20. Id. at 135.




25. Id. at 137.
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activity."2" Finally, construing the Sherman Act to prohibit the public-
ity campaign "would raise important constitutional questions. ' 27 Spe-
cifically, the Court feared that affirming the lower courts might impair
the railroads' first amendment right to petition the government.28
While noting these constitutional issues, Noerr held only that the pub-
licity campaign did not constitute a restraint of trade within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act.2 9 The Court did not decide that the first
amendment prohibited application of the Sherman Act in some cases.
3 0
The Court rejected the truckers' argument that use of the third-
party technique brought the publicity campaign within the reach of
the antitrust laws. It concluded that "[i]nsofar as [the Sherman] Act
sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that condemns trade re-
straints, not political activity, and . . . a publicity campaign to influ-
ence government action clearly falls into the category of political activ-
ity.""1 Nevertheless, in dictum the Court explained that not all forms
of petitioning are immune from antitrust liability: "There may be situ-
ations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influ-
encing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act
would be justified.' '32 Noerr was not such a case, however, because the
truckers did not dispute that the publicity campaign was genuinely in-
tended to influence government action. Any damage the truckers suf-
fered was merely an "incidental effect of the railroads' campaign to
influence governmental action.
'33
Four years later, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,34 the
Court revealed how broad Noerr's protection could be. In Pennington
the United Mine Workers and a group of large coal mining operators
jointly asked the Secretary of Labor to set a minimum wage under the
Walsh-Healey Act35 for employees of coal contractors selling to the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The Secretary agreed, setting a
rate that made it difficult for small, nonunion coal mines to sell to the
TVA in the contract market.36 The union and the larger mines also
26. Id.
27. Id. at 138.
28. Id. at 137-38.
29. Id. at 137.
30. Id. at 132 n.6.
31. Id. at 140-41.
32. Id. at 144.
33. Id. at 143.
34. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
35. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
36. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 660.
1990]
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urged the TVA to curtail its purchases of coal in the spot markets,
which were largely unaffected by the Walsh-Healey Act, and allegedly
engaged in a collusive price-cutting campaign in the TVA spot market
designed to put the small mines out of business.37 The small mines
filed an antitrust claim and won $270,000 in treble damages in the dis-
trict court.38
The Supreme Court reversed.39 The small mine companies had ar-
gued that Noerr did not control the case because the union and larger
companies had asked for the establishment of minimum wage rates
with an anticompetitive purpose. The Court, however, summarily re-
jected that position, stating that under Noerr "[j]oint efforts to influ-
ence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though in-
tended to eliminate competition.
'4 0
One commentator has accurately noted that Pennington repre-
sents a considerable extension of Noerr.4' Immunity for the union's ef-
forts to persuade the Secretary of Labor to set a minimum wage rate is
plainly consistent with Noerr. But the Court largely ignored allegations
of predatory conduct by the union and larger mines in the spot market.
Even though the TVA is a governmental entity, its coal purchases
would seem to be precisely the type of commercial activity that falls
within the parameters of the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, given the
Court's apparent lack of concern about the nature of the TVA's
purchasing decisions, Pennington can be read as holding that petition-
ing of governmental actors who are making purely commercial deci-
sions falls outside the reach of the Sherman Act.42
B. California Motor Transport and the Sham Exception
The final case in the original Noerr trilogy, California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 3 has befuddled courts faced
with claims of Noerr immunity perhaps more than any other case. The
Court's unusually casual language and broad dicta can be interpreted
to support any particular result a tribunal might wish to reach when
faced with a Noerr claim.
In California Motor Transport, Trucking Unlimited filed an anti-
trust action against a group of its competitors, alleging that they had
37. Id. at 660-61.
38. Id. at 661.
39. Id. at 657.
40. Id. at 670.
41. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The
Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHL L. REV. 80, 85 (1977).
42. Id. at 85-86; cf. supra note 6 (discussing "commercial activity" exception).
43. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
[Vol. 41
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used administrative and judicial proceedings in a concerted effort to
thwart its efforts to obtain operating rights.44 The defendants claimed
immunity under Noerr, and the district court dismissed the suit. The
Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court, holding that Noerr
did not protect petitioning of administrative and judicial bodies.4" The
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, but rejected its reasoning.
After reviewing the holdings in Noerr and Pennington, the Court con-
cluded that
it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold
that groups with common interests may not, without violating the an-
titrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal
agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view re-
specting resolution of the business and economic interests vis-a-vis
their competitors.
4"
Perhaps no single statement has caused more difficulty in discerning
the source and scope of protection under the Noerr doctrine. Some
courts47 and commentators 4" have read this statement as making Noerr
a creature of constitutional mandate rather than statutory construc-
tion, despite the Noerr Court's refusal to address the first amendment
issue.4 Ascertaining the source of Noerr's protection is vital to defining
the parameters of the doctrine. For example, if Noerr is required by
the first amendment, then it also must apply to state antitrust laws."
If, however, the Noerr doctrine merely represents a construction of the
Sherman Act, some petitioning activity not protected by the first
amendment might nevertheless be immune from antitrust liabilityr1
44. Id. at 509.
45. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir.
1970), afl'd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
46. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510-11.
47. See, e.g., Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F.
Supp. 553, 556 (D. Del. 1980) (scope of Noerr doctrine defined by reference to scope of
first amendment protection).
48. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 41; Note, Noerr-Pennington Immunity from Anti-
trust Liability under Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.:
Replacing the Sham Exception with a Constitutional Analysis, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
1305, 1310, 1323-32 (1984).
49. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Although this is a plausible position,
California Motor Transp. does not expressly purport to replace Noerr's statutory con-
struction with a constitutional analysis. Likewise, its reliance on the first amendment in
part is not inconsistent with the approach taken by the Court in Noerr.
50. See Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the First Amendment: The Disag-
gregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 330-31 (1988) (suggesting that if Noerr is
based on the first amendment, it applies to both state law and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act).
51. See Kintner & Bauer, Antitrust Exemptions for Private Requests for Govern-
1990]
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Although the source of Noerr immunity still remains unresolved,52
this troublesome issue did not impede the California Motor Transport
majority. Having decided that Noerr immunity extended to the peti-
tioning of administrative agencies and the judiciary, the Court immedi-
ately narrowed the scope of that protection by breathing life into the
so-called "sham exception. 5 3 The Noerr Court had suggested that pe-
titioning intended to injure a competitor directly, rather than to influ-
ence governmental action, would not merit antitrust immunity. 4 Cali-
fornia Motor Transport gave that dictum binding effect. The
defendants had allegedly instituted judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings "'with or without probable cause, and regardless of the merits
of the cases.'"5 The allegations, the Court said, stated a claim under
the sham exception, for such "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims"
would amount to an abuse of the administrative and judicial
processes.50
These conclusions should have been sufficient to dispose of the
case. Unfortunately, the Court also muddled the sham exception by
listing a number of other unethical petitioning tactics, such as perjury
and misrepresentation, and suggesting that they too might fall within
the sham exception, depending upon the governmental body from
whom the petitioner sought action. 1 In short, the Court suggested that
if a petitioner seeks legislative action, then Noerr immunity is broad.
But if a petitioner seeks judicial or administrative action, then unethi-
cal petitioning, even though genuinely intended to influence govern-
mental action, may fall within the sham exception. This interpretation
expanded the sham exception delineated by the Noerr Court and led
the lower courts to take an expansive view of the sham exception in an
effort to curb what they considered to be petitioning abuses.5
After California Motor Transport, the Court did not directly ad-
dress another Noerr claim for sixteen years. During that time the lower
courts struggled with the appropriate framework for analyzing Noerr
claims. The uncertain source and scope of the doctrine led to particu-
mental Action: A Critical Analysis of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 17 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 549, 551 n.7 (1984).
52. See infra notes 174-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Noerr doctrine
and the first amendment and suggesting that Noerr rests on a construction of the Sher-
man Act).
53. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
55. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512.
56. Id. at 513.
57. Id. at 512-13.
58. See infra notes 210-30 and accompanying text (discussing cases defining the
scope of the sham exception).
[Vol. 41
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larly divergent results in its application. Thus, by the time Allied Tube
& Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.59 reached the courts, clarifica-
tion of the Noerr doctrine's myriad of uncertainties was overdue.
II. THE ALLIED TUBE CASE
The Allied Tube decision arose from a dispute between makers of
steel electrical conduit and makers of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) electri-
cal conduit. As the Court described it, conduit is "the hollow tubing
used as a raceway to carry electrical wires through the walls and floors
of buildings." 60 Generally, the type of conduit used in buildings is not
left to the discretion of a builder or electrician, but is prescribed by
state or local law. Because most legislators lack the technical expertise
to draft a workable set of regulations, legislative bodies rarely write the
applicable statutes. Instead, most state and local governments enact
model codes published by private standard-setting organizations. The
drafting of one of those model codes, the National Electric Code
(NEC), was the basis of the controversy in Allied Tube.
The NEC is published and revised every three years by the Na-
tional Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a private, voluntary associ-
ation of industry, labor, insurers, medicine, and academia." The NFPA
operates through a process known as" 'consensus standard making.' )62
NEC revisions are initiated by the association's members, who submit
proposals to a reviewing panel of experts. If the review panel approves
a measure, it is then submitted for final approval of those members in
attendance at the NFPA's annual meeting.6 3
Before 1980 the NEC permitted the use of steel conduit, and, in
fact, most of the conduit sold in the United States was steel.6 4 In Sep-
tember 1978, however, Indian Head, Inc. proposed that the NFPA in-
clude PVC conduit as an approved material in its 1981 revised code.
An expert panel reviewed the proposal thoroughly and also considered
a report by Underwriters Laboratories on the matter. It approved PVC
for inclusion in the NEC in December 1979. The NFPA then scheduled
a vote of the full membership on the proposal for the annual meeting
in May 1980.6"
Indian Head's chances of successfully marketing PVC conduit de-
pended heavily on the product's inclusion in the NEC. Although In-
59. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
60. Id. at 496.
61. Id. at 495.
62. Id.
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dian Head claimed that PVC conduit was more pliable, cheaper to in-
stall, and less susceptible to short circuiting than its steel counterpart,
certain scientific evidence suggested it posed safety risks. Specifically,
there was some fear that during fires in high-rise buildings PVC con-
duit might burn and emit toxic fumes. On a more practical level, "a
substantial number of state and local governments routinely adopt the
[NEC] into law with little or no change."68 Thus, exclusion of PVC
conduit from the NEC meant that it could not be used in a number of
areas. Even in those jurisdictions that did not adopt the NEC or that
amended it to allow for the use of PVC conduit, approval was vital to
Indian Head's marketing plans. Private certification services, such as
Underwriters Laboratories, normally will not list and label an electrical
product that does not meet NEC standards. Insurers will not insure
buildings that do not conform to NEC provisions, and many electri-
cians and contractors simply refuse to use materials not approved by
the NEC.6 7 Therefore, absent inclusion in the code, Indian Head could
expect resistance to its efforts to market PVC as a viable alternative to
steel conduit, whatever the product's alleged advantages.
Armed with this knowledge and alarmed at the competitive threat
posed by Indian Head's proposal, a group of steel conduit manufactur-
ers, led by Allied Tube and Conduit Corporation, undertook a joint
effort to exclude PVC conduit from the 1981 NEC. Since PVC could
not be included in the code without approval by a majority of NFPA
members in attendance at the 1980 annual meeting, the steel interests
recruited 230 persons to join the NFPA and to attend the meeting for
the purpose of voting against Indian Head's proposal. Allied Tube
alone enlisted 155 new members, including some of its executives, em-
ployees, sales agents and their employees, and the wife of a national
sales director.0 8 The steel interests paid over $100,000 to enroll these
new NFPA members and to see that they attended the annual
meeting.0 9
At the meeting Allied Tube and the other steel manufacturers in-
structed these new members where to sit and how to vote." None of
66. Id. at 495. Even those state and local governments that amended the NEC made
only minor revisions. Among the states that had adopted the NEC by June 1982, 26 had
adopted it without any changes. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 817
F.2d 938, 939 n.1 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 492 (1988). Nineteen states had adopted
it with amendments, but those jurisdictions changed on average only 12 of the NEC's
114 articles. Id. Among cities, 232 adopted the NEC as written and 256 adopted it with
amendments, but changed on average only 11 of the code's articles. Id. at 939-40.
67. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495-96.
68. Id. at 496-97.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss3/6
CLAIMS OF NOERR IMMUNITY
these persons had the technical knowledge or data to follow the discus-
sion on the merits of Indian Head's proposal. None spoke against the
proposal or otherwise participated actively in the proceedings. Never-
theless, when the matter came to a vote, the new members voted as a
bloc against the PVC proposal. Allied Tube monitored the group by
stationing group leaders throughout the meeting hall. These group
leaders used walkie-talkies and hand signals to explain to the new
members when and how to vote on various questions brought to the
floor. With the solid opposition of the newly enrolled members, the
NFPA rejected Indian Head's proposal by a 394-390 margin.7'
Indian Head appealed to the NFPA board of directors, arguing
that the steel interests had "stacked" the vote on the PVC proposal by
enlisting new members whose sole role was to vote against it. The
board denied the appeal on the ground that no NFPA rules had been
violated.7 2 It did, however, agree that the steel interests had circum-
vented the association's rules. To prevent such a recurrence, the board
adopted new regulations requiring persons to be NFPA members for a
minimum of 180 days before they acquired voting privileges at an an-
nual meeting.7
3
After its unsuccessful appeal to the NFPA board, Indian Head
sued Allied Tube under section I of the Sherman Act.7 4 Its complaint
alleged that Allied Tube conspired with other steel conduit makers to
exclude PVC conduit from the NEC and thus from the market as a
whole.7 5 At a bifurcated trial the jury found that while Allied Tube had
a genuine concern about the safety of PVC conduit and that its actions
at the NFPA meeting in 1980 were motivated, at least in part, by that
concern, it nevertheless subverted the NFPA's standard-setting pro-
cess. 6 The jury also found that Allied Tube's actions had an adverse
impact on competition and therefore unreasonably restrained trade.77
It therefore awarded Indian Head $3.8 million in actual damages for
lost profits resulting from the exclusion of PVC conduit from the
NEC.78 According to the Supreme Court, the jury awarded no damages
for lost profits flowing from the adoption of the 1981 code by any gov-
ernmental body; Indian Head sought compensation only for the
"stigma" that exclusion from the NEC imprinted on PVC conduit and
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Brief of Respondent at 7, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492 (1988) (No. 87-157).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
75. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 497.
76. Id. at 497-98.
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for Allied Tube's subsequent efforts to market that stigma.79
79. Id. at 498 n.2. A full understanding of the case requires a discussion on damages.
Throughout the proceedings Allied Tube contended that Indian Head sought compensa-
tion for injury inflicted by passage of the NEC by state and local legislatures. Of course,
the Sherman Act generally does not allow recovery of damages when state statutes and
local ordinances prohibit use of such products because such legislative conduct falls
within the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Even if Parker
is not applicable, passage of the NEC by legislative bodies may be an intervening cause
of the claimant's damages and thus bar recovery. Cf. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAmP, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 201 (Supp. 1988) (in Noerr-Pennington context, government's decision to
act reflects independent choice and constitutes supervening cause between defendant's
action and plaintiff's damages); Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First
Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEo. L.J. 65, 123 (1985) ("In the absence
of egregious conduct, a governmental decision favorable to the petitioner will negate the
proximate causation of any competitive injury."). Indian Head, however, denied Allied
Tube's contention and claimed that it sought damages only for the "stigma" that exclu-
sion from the NEC had caused PVC conduit in the marketplace. During argument on
Allied Tube's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the trial judge
indicated that he did not recall the "stigma" theory being advanced at trial. Joint Ap-
pendix at 66, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (No.
87-167). Nevertheless, the record reflects that when the case was submitted to the jury,
the trial judge set forth Indian Head's "stigma" theory in detail:
[TJhe plaintiff's argument is what happened in May 1980 has created a certain
stigma on the product which has carried through and that the defendants have
attempted to market that stigma in the years which have ensued so that the
extent of the damages which it now suffered [sic] are as a direct resulted [sic]
of what happened in 1980, and that is the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff claims
his damages do result from what happened in May 1980 and not from any
conduct of the defendants that they were engaged in other than the marketing
of that defeat in 1980 in the years that follow. That's the plaintiff's claim.
The plaintiff does not seek damages resulting from any of the defendant's
conduct other than its conduct at the May 1980 meeting and its marketing of
that defeat in the marketplace.
To the extent that the defendant has sought to bring to the public's atten-
tion safety questions, to the extent the defendant has sought to legislate - to
lobby before legislative bodies or political bodies with respect to the safety
question, the plaintiff does not claim any damages from that conduct, and such
conduct may not be a proper predicate for you to assess any damages because
that type of conduct would be protected and is not a violation of the antitrust
laws. The defendants are entitled to take whatever measures they want to take
to inform the public or the public bodies involved of their concerns about the
safety issues and the plaintiffs do not seek any damages as a result of that
conduct,
So the ultimate test for you to decide is, . do the damages . . . which
[the plaintiff] claim[s] [it] suffered result from what happened in 1980 and the
defendant's efforts since 1980 to rely upon that or utilize that factor in the
marketplace. Those damages are properly recoverable . ...
Id. at 30-31.
Despite this charge, the trial judge, in granting Allied Tube's motion for JNOV,
rejected Indian Head's argument that the case had been submitted to the jury on the
[Vol. 41
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss3/6
CLAIMS OF NOERR IMMUNITY
Allied Tube moved to set aside the verdict on the ground that No-
err protected its conduct. Because the NEC is widely adopted by a
number of state and local legislatures, Allied Tube argued that its op-
position to Indian Head's proposal at the NFPA meeting constituted a
form of petitioning for governmental action. The trial court agreed and
granted Allied Tube's motion for judgment notw._ithstanding the ver-
dict, but the Second Circuit reversed."0
III. ALLIED TuBE IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR NOERR
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment,
agreeing that Noerr was inapplicable to the facts of Allied Tube. It did
not, however, accept the Second Circuit's reasoning that Noerr did not
reach the petitioning of private groups. Instead, the Court established
a two-step analysis for claims of Noerr immunity depending upon "the
source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue."8"
If the restraint "'is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed
to private action,' those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute
immunity from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint." 2
If, however, the restraint flows from private action, a party may still
enjoy Noerr immunity if the restraint is merely" 'incidental' to a valid
effort to influence governmental action. 8 3 Thus, in analyzing claims of
Noerr immunity, the first question is whether the restraint results
from governmental or private action.
"stigma" theory. Petition for Cert., Appendix A, at 31. According to the trial judge, In-
dian Head never "abandoned [its] position . . .that the damages in this case flowed
from legislative action." Id.
In reversing the judgment of the lower court, the Second Circuit found that indeed
the jury had been charged on the "stigma" theory and brushed aside any notion that
Indian Head had sought recovery for injury resulting from the NEC's adoption by vari-
ous governments. Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 941
n.3 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 492 (1988). The Supreme Court noted the dispute
concerning the damage theory, but decided the case "as it was framed by the Court of
Appeals." Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 498 n.2.
80. See Allied Tube, 817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1987).
81. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499. The Court also granted certiorari to determine
whether Allied Tube's conduct, if not immune under Noerr, constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade. It ultimately vacated the grant of certiorari on that issue as improvi-
dent. Id. at 499 n.3. Given its disposition of that issue, the Court could and did assume
that Allied Tube's conduct was unreasonable in the absence of Noerr immunity.
82. Id. at 499 (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1965)) (emphasis added).
83. Id. (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143)(emphasis added).
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A. The Governmental Action/Private Action Dichotomy: The
Intersection of Noerr and the State Action Doctrine of Parker v.
Brown
Much of the dispute in Allied Tube centered around proper char-
acterization of the NFPA. Although Allied Tube contended that the
NFPA constituted a quasi-legislative body solely because legislatures
routinely adopt the NEC, the majority summarily dismissed the argu-
ment.84 Although it gave no real analysis of the problem, the Court
focused on three factors that it found to be hallmarks of private action:
(1) the NFPA is unaccountable to the public; (2) the NFPA lacks offi-
cial authority; and (3) the NFPA is composed in part of persons and
organizations who have financial interests in restraining trade.85 While
admitting that the "line between restraints resulting from governmen-
tal action and those resulting from private action may not always be
obvious," the Court had "no difficulty concluding that the restraint [at
issue in Allied Tube] ...resulted from private action."86
This result is indisputably correct. From a conceptual standpoint,
however, the Court's analysis is lacking. Certainly none of the factors
enumerated by the Court are objectionable as indicia of private action.
Nonetheless, they do not distinguish the activity at issue in Allied
Tube from the allegedly anticompetitive conduct immunized in Noerr
and Pennington; the same characteristics describe the railroad combi-
nation in Noerr and the coal mining combination in Pennington. Addi-
tionally, the Court's failure to fashion any guidelines for distinguishing
between governmental and private restraints is surprising, especially
when the distinction plays such a central role in analyzing claims of
Noerr immunity under the Allied Tube approach. Assuming that im-
munity from antitrust liability in such cases is truly absolute, a worka-
ble standard differentiating governmental restraints from private con-
duct would allow the lower courts to dispose of many antitrust claims
before trial. Perhaps the Court did not need to establish a test to re-
solve the dichotomy between governmental and private action to dis-
pose of the case; Allied Tube stipulated that the NFPA is a private,
not a public, body.87 Indian Head's damage theory also allowed the
Court to sidestep the issue.88 Nevertheless, this skeletal analysis is puz-
zling because the Court has familiar tools with which to make the
84, Id. at 501-02.
85. Id. at 502.
86. Id.
87. See Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 943 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1987).
88. See supra note 79.
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determination.
Distinctions between governmental action and private action are
not new to antitrust jurisprudence. Although rooted in the Court's de-
cision in Olsen v. Smith, 9 the distinction blossomed in Parker v.
Brown.90 Parker addressed a challenge to a raisin marketing program
under the California Agricultural Prorate Act 9l that was designed to
reduce competition among growers and maintain their prices. A dis-
gruntled grower sued the state administrator of the program, claiming
that the regulatory scheme violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
9 2
The Court assumed, without deciding, that the program would consti-
tute an unreasonable restraint of trade if organized and effected solely
by an agreement among private parties.93 Nevertheless, it refused to
enjoin the prorate program because it concluded that "nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act. . .suggests that its purpose was to re-
strain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature."94 The Sherman Act, the Court held, prohibits "individual
and not state action.
95
From this seemingly simple holding, the Court struggled to find
some workable boundaries for antitrust's unique federalism problem,
the state action doctrine. Although Parker addressed claims for injunc-
tive relief only, its logic applies equally to treble damages actions
against restraints resulting from state economic regulations. That same
logic also dictates that private action taken pursuant to state regula-
tory programs be immune from antitrust scrutiny. Otherwise, Parker
becomes "an empty formalism, standing for little more than the pro-
position that [the plaintiff, by filing a claim solely against state offi-
cials,] sued the wrong parties."9 " Nevertheless, on at least two subse-
quent occasions the Court suggested that state action immunity did
not apply unless the antitrust plaintiff had named the state or state
officials as defendants in the suit.9 7 On other occasions the Court as-
89. 195 U.S. 332 (1904) (upholding Texas statute limiting pilotage of vessels at port
of Gavelston to licensed state pilots).
90. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
91. Id. at 348-49.
92. Id. at 310-12.
93. Id. at 350.
94. Id. at 350-51.
95. Id. at 352.
96. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 616 n.4 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). See also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 56-57 (1985) (citing Stewart dissent in Cantor with approval).
97. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977); Cantor, 428 U.S. at 591-92
(plurality opinion) ("Since the case now before us does not call into question the legality
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serted that Parker applied only when a state regulatory program com-
pelled private parties to act in a manner that restrained trade.", At
other times the Court stated that Parker immunity applied only if it
were "necessary" to make a state regulatory program work." None of
these tests, however, has withstood recent developments.
After grappling with the scope of Parker immunity for private par-
ties, the Court finally settled upon a two-prong test for evaluating such
claims. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Alu-
98. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-60; Cantor, 428 U.S. at 592-93 (plurality opinion);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). Goldfarb had perhaps the most
explicit statement concerning the compulsion requirement: "It is not enough that...
anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities
must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign." Id. The Court has
since discarded the compulsion requirement. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at
61-62.
Interestingly, the Southern Motor Carriers Court did not purport to overrule Gold-
farb. It did, however, engage in what might be termed revisionist history. In Goldfarb
the Court held that a minimum fee schedule promulgated by a county bar association
and enforced in some measure by the disciplinary rules of the state bar did not enjoy
immunity from antitrust scrutiny. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791-92. The decision rested in
part on the state's failure to require lawyers to adhere to the fee schedule. The Southern
Motor Carriers Court, however, recast the Goldfarb holding. Goldfarb, it stated, "is not
properly read as making compulsion a sine qua non to state action immunity.. . . The
focal point of the Goldfarb opinion was the source of the anticompetitive policy, rather
than whether the challenged conduct was compelled." Southern Motor Carriers, 471
U.S. at 60. It is difficult to reconcile this language with the Goldfarb Court's assertion
that "[tihe threshold inquiry in determining . . . [claims of immunity under Parker v.
Brown] is whether the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." Goldfarb,
421 U.S. at 790.
99. Bates, 433 U.S. at 361; Cantor, 428 U.S. at 597-98 (plurality opinion). This test
was taken from another line of cases in which the Court has attempted to define when a
federal regulatory scheme results in an implied repeal of the antitrust laws. It reflects
the disfavored status of statutory repeal by implication. Under this approach a federal
regulatory program implicitly repeals the antitrust laws only when "necessary to make
the . . . [regulatory act] work." Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963). Even then the scope of the implied repeal is limited "to the minimum extent
necessary" Id. This rule has been applied in numerous "implied repeal" cases. See, e.g.,
National Gerimedical Hasp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981);
United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Gordon v. New
York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963). The Southern Motor Carriers Court also rejected application of the
"necessity" test to claims of immunity under Parker v. Brown. See Southern Motor Car-
riers, 471 U.S. at 57 n.21. Application of this test to state regulatory programs has been
criticized as a vehicle for judicial interference with state economic regulation reminiscent
of the substantive due process doctrine of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and
its progeny. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 627-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also 1 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 214, at 88 (1978) (application of "necessity" test prompts
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minum, Inc.,'"0 the Court held that state action immunity shields pri-
vate parties from liability for following anticompetitive state regula-
tions if. (1) the restraint is a "'clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed' goal of state policy;"' 0'11 and (2) the state itself "'actively
supervise[s]'" the private conduct. 10 2 Since adopting this approach,
the Court has adhered to it strictly, except in limited circumstances
when plaintiffs have brought antitrust claims against state actors' 0 3 or
municipalities.0 4 Because the Midcal test is designed to distinguish
100. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
101. Id. at 105 (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96,
109 (1978)).
102. Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
410 (1978)(plurality opinion)).
103. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). Hoover held that a committee of
bar examiners appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court was immune from antitrust lia-
bility under Parker. The committee had administered and graded a bar examination
taken by respondent Ronwin. Ronwin failed and the committee recommended that the
Arizona Supreme Court deny him admission to the bar. Ronwin then filed an antitrust
suit. The Court, noting that the Arizona Constitution granted the state supreme court
plenary authority to determine admissions to the bar, concluded that the committee's
acts were acts of the state supreme court itself in the exercise of its sovereign powers. It
therefore declared the conduct immune without analyzing it under the Midcal test.
"When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself,... the danger of unauthorized re-
straint of trade does not arise. Where the conduct at issue is in fact that of the state
legislature or supreme court, we need not address the issues of 'clear articulation' and
'active supervision.'" Id. at 569.
104. See, e.g.;Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986); Town of Halie v. City
of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40 (1982). Municipalities are not beyond the reach of the Sherman Act by vir-
tue of their status as political subdivisions of the state. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38;
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52. If, however, a municipality acts pursuant to a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy - that is, it meets the first prong of
the Midcal test - the action is immune from antitrust attack without further supervi-
sion from the state. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47.
Shortly after the Court's decision in City of Boulder, Congress passed legislation to
shield municipalities from potential treble damages liability. See Local Government An-
titrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36
(1988)). The Act does not apply to actions against municipalities seeking injunctive
relief.
Fisher apparently raised another barrier to actions under the Sherman Act to enjoin
enforcement of municipal ordinances. According to the Fisher Court, the question of
Parker immunity need not be addressed in these suits unless the Sherman Act preempts
the ordinance. Fisher, 475 U.S. at 265. Preemption, in turn, occurs only when the ordi-
nance conflicts irreconcilably with the antitrust laws. Such conflict exists, for example,
when the ordinance requires conduct that constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 264-66; Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). The plaintiff
in Fisher challenged a rent control ordinance passed by popular referendum in Berkeley,
California. The Court refused to strike the ordinance because it could not find an agree-
ment between the city and landlords to fix rental prices. Fisher, 475 U.S. at 266-70.
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between restraints imposed by government and those imposed by pri-
vate parties, it is adaptable to the distinction between governmental
and private restraints at issue in claims of Noerr immunity. Further-
more, because the Noerr doctrine has often been described as a natural
analogue to Parker v. Brown,0 5 the Midcal test logically fits the
Court's framework established in Allied Tube. In fact, any other ap-
proach might create an irrational dislocation in antitrust law. The defi-
nition of state action ought not to change depending upon whether a
party is asking for or responding to governmental conduct.
Using the Midcal test to distinguish between governmental and
private action would not narrow the scope of Noerr immunity. Noerr
cannot be strictly limited to those cases in which a party petitions for
what would be state action under Midcal.0 6 The Allied Tube Court
made clear that even if a restraint is imposed by private parties, Noerr
immunity might still apply if the restraint is "incidental" to a valid
attempt to influence the government. 0 7 Application of the Midcal test
would merely answer a threshold question: whether a petitioning
party's conduct is entitled to absolute immunity because it results in
no private action that restrains trade.
Applying the Midcal test to the facts in Allied Tube would not
have changed the result. First, no discernible state policy supports pro-
mulgation of the NEC. In petitioning the NFPA to exclude PVC con-
duit from the 1981 code, Allied Tube sought immediate action from
private parties, not from government. While that alone would not de-
feat Allied Tube's claim of Noerr immunity, it counsels against treat-
Absent such an agreement, no violation of section 1 could be established, let alone a per
se violation, and thus, the Sherman Act did not preempt the ordinance. Id.
Despite the Court's suggestion that preemption analysis differs from state action
immunity under Parker, several commentators have convincingly shown that the two
issues are identical. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, % 209.2; Garland,
Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J.
486, 502-08 (1987).
105. See Baker, Exchange of Information for Presentation to Government Agen-
cies: The Interplay of the Container and Noerr Doctrines, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 354, 356-57
(1975) (Noerr represents flipside of Parker v. Brown); Hurwitz, supra note 79, at 76
(Noerr not an extension of Parker but a complement to it). This view seems unassaila-
ble. Parker and its progeny control those cases in which private parties comply with a
governmentally adopted regulatory program. Noerr and its progeny control when private
parties urge the government to adopt a program that restrains trade.
106. See In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568, 583-85 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (rejecting argument that Noerr immunity is coextensive with state action im-
munity under Parker), aff'd, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1113
(1983); see also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, 1 203.2a, at 28 (commenting
favorably on In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig.).
107. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499, 502
(1988); see infra notes 131-73 and accompanying text.
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ing any resulting restraint as governmental conduct. Admittedly,
twenty-six states adopted the product of the NFPA's deliberations
without changes, and another nineteen adopted it with only minor
amendments. s0 8 Yet that fact does not prove that the NEC was drafted
pursuant to any clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy. Arguably, governmental enactment of the NEC reflects a ratifi-
cation of the code-drafting process. This reasoning, however, ignores
that in prior state action cases, the Court has demanded some clear
articulation and affirmative expression of state policy to displace com-
petition before a private party undertakes some potentially anticompe-
titive activity.10 9 The only authority devolving on the NFPA and its
members was a de facto approval resulting from a pattern of NEC
adoption by various legislative bodies over a number of years."0 That
alone is insufficient to meet the first prong of the Midcal test."'
But even if Allied Tube's conduct had fallen within the first prong
of the Midcal test, it failed to meet the second prong, which requires
that the private activity be actively supervised by the state."' The
purpose of the active supervision requirement is clear. While Parker
allows states to displace competition in some markets with a regulatory
scheme, it does not allow the states to subvert the fundamental na-
tional policy favoring competition by licensing private parties to vio-
late the Sherman Act. 1 3 Therefore, when a state regulates a market or
industry in a manner that would otherwise violate the Sherman Act, it
undertakes a corresponding duty to oversee the implementation and
operation of the regulatory scheme." 4 Traditionally, states have chosen
108. See supra note 66.
109. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976)(no antitrust immunity
when state agency passively accepts public utility tariff); see also Southern Motor Carri-
ers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64 ("[I]n Cantor the anticompe-
titive acts of a public utility were held unprotected because the Michigan Legislature
had indicated no intention to displace competition in the relevant market.").
110. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 501.
111. The Allied Tube Court apparently understood this to be true. See id. ("We
agree with the Court of Appeals that the [NFPA] cannot be treated as a 'quasi-legisla-
tive' body simply because legislatures routinely adopt the Code the [NFPA] publishes.").
112. Failure to satisfy one prong of the Midcal test precludes a finding of immunity
under Parker's state action doctrine. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988) (only
if act of private party meets both prongs of Midcal test is it fairly attributable to the
state; failure to satisfy one prong precludes finding of state action immunity).
113. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("[A] state does not give immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring
that their action is lawful. ... ).
114. Because a private party cannot claim immunity from the antitrust laws for
compliance with a state regulatory scheme if the state does not actively supervise the
program, the antitrust laws effectively preempt an unsupervised, anticompetitive regula-
tory program. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, 1 209.2; Garland, supra
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to supervise their regulatory programs by administrative oversight115 or
through other state actors with administrative authority.1 6 The active
supervision requirement, however, leaves the states free to impose any
particular structure they deem appropriate as long as it does more
than cast" 'a gauzy cloak of state involvement' over what is essentially
private anticompetitive conduct.""17 Absent that supervision, "there is
no realistic assurance that a private party's anticompetitive conduct
promotes state policy, rather than merely the party's individual
interests."1 8
Several cases have considered exactly what constitutes active su-
pervision under the Midcal test."9 Although the Court has never set-
tled on a single verbal formulation of the requirement, the mere pres-
ence of some state monitoring is insufficient.'2 0 At a minimum, the
state must "exert[] . ..significant control over" the terms of the re-
straint. 2 1 Yet in its most recent pronouncement on the issue, the
Court apparently has established a more rigorous approach. The active
supervision prong of the Midcal test "mandates that the State exercise
ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct. 22 Al-
lied Tube's petitioning of the NFPA-in fact, the entire NFPA code-
drafting process-falls outside any standard of active supervision pre-
viously articulated by the Court.'2
The NFPA establishes its own rules for membership, for confer-
note 104, at 502-08.
115. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48 (1985).
116. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
117. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57 (quoting California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980)).
118. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
119. See, e.g., id.; 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987); Midcal, 445 U.S.
at 106.
120. 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 345 n.7; see also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976) (approval of utility tariff by Michigan Public Service Commis-
sion insufficient to confer antitrust immunity under Parker).
121. 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 345 n.7.
122. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
123. Because private standard-setting associations typically include members having
horizontal and vertical business relations, the Court has often noted their potential for
anticompetitive harm. As such, they have often been the subjects of antitrust scrutiny.
See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). As some
commentators have noted, private standard-setting associations routinely are treated as
continuing conspiracies of their members. 7 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 99, 1
1477, at 343 (1986). They are tolerated under the Sherman Act because of their potential
for procompetitive benefits, see Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 570-73, but they are not permit-
ted to engage in anticompetitive activity without state sanction.
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ring voting rights, and for drafting procedures for the NEC. None of
these rules or procedures is reviewed by any state agency. Of course,
some forty-five states adopt the product of this process either verbatim
or with few changes.124 Such legislative action may constitute supervi-
sion in some sense, but because of the negligible review most legisla-
tures give the substance of the NEC, this supervision amounts to no
more than the state rubber-stamping decisions made by a private
body. Such summary approval of the NFPA's recommendations, with-
out any "'pointed reexamination'" of the antecedent conduct generat-
ing those recommendations, has never been sufficient to satisfy the sec-
ond prong of the Midcal test.
1 5
Public policy also supports the Court's refusal to treat the re-
straint in Allied Tube as a governmental restraint. As a practical mat-
ter, no state is likely to undertake the review of the code-drafting pro-
cess sufficient to confer Parker immunity on the NFPA and its
membership. Because of the number of states that adopt the NEC, any
review procedure would be prone to what has been described in other
antitrust contexts as the "free rider" problem. 26 The first state to un-
124. Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 939 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1987), afl'd, 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
125. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
106 (1980). Midcal itself gives an indication of the type of supervision sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Parker. In Midcal a state statute required all wine producers and
wholesalers to file a fair trade contract or price schedule with the California Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control. No state-licensed wine merchant was allowed to sell to a
retailer at any price other than that posted in its price schedule or fair trade contract. As
the Court noted, this scheme constituted a legislatively mandated form of resale price
maintenance, id. at 103, a practice long forbidden by the Sherman Act. See Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Parker did not save the
restraint, despite the clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy favoring
resale price maintenance because
[t]he State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established
by private parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the reason-
ableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade
contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any
"pointed reexamination" of the program.
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06; see also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-06 (supervision of hospital's
physician peer review procedures by state health division, state board of medical examin-
ers, and state courts insufficient to confer immunity under Parker); 324 Liquor Corp.,
479 U.S. at 344-45 (1989) (state supervision of mandated resale price maintenance for
liquor sales insufficient to confer Parker immunity); cf. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 594-95 (1976) (Michigan Public Service Commission's routine approval of util-
ity's anticompetitive conduct not sufficient to confer immunity under Parker).
126. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 721-26 (1988);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977). A "free rider" may
be loosely defined as one who enjoys the benefits of another's labors or expenditures
without paying for them. A common example might be a discount retailer who provides
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dertake a review procedure would bear all of the administrative costs
of that process. Every other state considering adoption of the NEC
could then avoid the costs of a review procedure by merely rely-
ing-that is, "free riding"-on the first state's findings. Thus, the first
reviewing state would enjoy only a portion of the benefits of its review
while bearing all the costs. This "free rider" potential acts as a disin-
centive for any state to initiate a review of the code-drafting process. 12 7
Arguably, this analysis is equally applicable to uniform state laws,
such as the Uniform Commercial Code, and yet has not deterred indi-
vidual state review of these statutes. Proposals governing general com-
mercial transactions, however, involve only policy choices within an
area familiar to most legislators. While the importance of these matters
is not to be minimized, they differ substantially from a set of safety
standards based on scientific data. The question in considering electri-
cal codes is not, for example, whether the state wishes to impose some
minimal level of safety upon builders, but what requirements best
serve the safety standards the state wishes to promote. These matters
generally require technical expertise beyond the knowledge of the aver-
age legislator. In fact, the terms of the National Electric Code are so
detailed and grounded in expert assessment of scientific data that, ab-
sent the code's publication by the NFPA, states would largely be com-
pelled to adopt traditional regulatory schemes staffed by industry ex-
perts to achieve the same results." 8 Recognition of the value of the
NFPA's code-drafting process counsels against harsh antitrust treat-
ment.12 The potential for abuse of that process, however, as mani-
fested by Allied Tube, cautions against treating such restraints as gov-
ernmentally imposed absent strict compliance with the Midcal test.130
few promotional or maintenance services for his product and relies instead upon the
promotional and maintenance services provided by a nearby full-service retailer of the
same product to help sell his inventory. See id.
127. In another context the Court has allowed one jurisdiction to rely on the find-
ings and experiences of other jurisdictions in enacting legislation. See City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986) (city need not conduct new studies or
produce evidence of harmful effects of adult theatres before enacting zoning ordinance
dispersing them; city may rely on experiences of other jurisdictions as long as that evi-
dence is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem addressed).
128. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 502 (1988)
(noting that state and local governments lack the resources and technical expertise to
second guess the NEC's drafters). For example, the states might have to create regula-
tory bodies similar to those governing public utility rates or intrastate trucking rates to
regulate the design and installation of electrical wiring systems, which is the function of
the National Electric Code.
129. See id. at 501 (potential benefits provided by standard-setting associations
have led most lower courts to apply rule of reason rather than per se analysis to re-
straints imposed by such groups).
130. This is not to suggest that actual adoption of the NEC by a state legislature
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B. "Incidental" Restraints, "Valid" Petitioning, and the
Political Activity/Commercial Activity Dichotomy
Antitrust immunity for petitioning activity does not depend on
governmental conduct. The Allied Tube majority noted that "Noerr
immunity might ... apply.., if... the exclusion of polyvinyl chlo-
ride conduit from the Code, and the effect that exclusion had of its
own force in the marketplace, were incidental to a valid effort to influ-
ence governmental action.' 13 1 This conclusion is unobjectionable; in-
deed, it seems compelled by the Noerr decision itself. The railroads'
publicity campaign in Noerr was directed at the public at large with
the hope that a swing in public sentiment might induce a favorable
governmental response. 32 Thus, while the petitioning activity in Noerr
sought governmental action as its ultimate goal, it was not directed at
any state or local governmental agency.
Allied Tube argued that its petitioning fell squarely within this
branch of the Noerr doctrine. Throughout the case it maintained that
Indian Head's injury, if any, resulted largely from "the predictable
adoption of the Code into law by a large number of state and local
governments. ' 133 It also argued that the NEC's wide acceptance by
governmental bodies made lobbying the NFPA the most efficient
means of influencing legislation regulating electrical conduit.13  Both
the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court rejected Allied Tube's dam-
age theory, but the Supreme Court admitted that Allied Tube's second
point "ha[d] some force.'
35
The Second Circuit had refused to regard Allied Tube's conduct as
petitioning of the government within the meaning of Noerr. 36 It based
that decision on the following three factors: (1) Allied Tube's conduct
amounted to business conduct rather than a request for legislative ac-
tion;137 (2) the Noerr doctrine, as an implied exemption from the anti-
trust laws, must be narrowly construed;"' and (3) Allied Tube's con-
falls outside the Parker doctrine. The restraint at issue in Allied Tube, however, did not
result from any legislative action but from Allied Tube's subversion of the code-drafting
process.
131. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502.
132. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
133. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 945 (2d Cir),
afl'd, 484 U.S. 814 (1987) (Allied Tube's activities not petitioning of government but a
subversion of the legislative purposes of the NFPA).
137. Id.
138. Id.; see also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pierno, 458 U.S. 119, 126, 134 (1982)
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duct was not "'political activity'" within a "'political arena.' ,19
Much of this reasoning found its way into the Supreme Court's opin-
ion, although the Court rejected the Second Circuit's conclusion that
petitioning of private parties could not be protected by Noerr." °0
The Court accepted Allied Tube's contention that its conduct was
a form of petitioning genuinely intended to influence governmental ac-
tion and that its central anticompetitive effect was incidental to the
petitioning efforts.1 But the Court refused to accept Allied Tube's
"absolutist position that the Noerr doctrine immunizes every concerted
effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action.'
1 42
This decision apparently leaves intact the Second Circuit's distinction
between antecedent conduct generating recommendations and submis-
sion of those recommendations to a governmental body. This conclu-
sion undoubtedly represents the correct approach, since any other re-
sult would undermine much of the Sherman Act's force. As the Court
noted, such reasoning would, for example, immunize price fixing agree-
ments among competitors in a regulated industry as long as the com-
petitors submitted the agreement to a ratemaking agency that actually
sets prices. " 3
Having rejected the argument that Noerr protects all petitioning
genuinely intended to influence governmental action, the Court had to
(narrowly construing antitrust law exemptions to find that health insurer's activities did
not constitute an exemption as being the "business of insurance").
139. Allied Tube, 817 F.2d at 946.
140. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 510
(1988).
141. See id. at 502-03.
142. Id. at 503.
143. Id. (dictum). Allied Tube does not alter the holding in Southern Motor Carri-
ers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985). In that case the Court held
that state policies permitting collective ratemaking in the trucking industry immunized
the conduct from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). The distinction between Southern Motor Carriers and the hypo-
thetical suggested by the Allied Tube Court is the state authorization and supervision of
the anticompetitive conduct present in the former case. In the latter, unsupervised an-
ticompetitive conduct was used to influence governmental action.
The Court also noted that Allied Tube's absolutist position might require immuniza-
tion of other forms of anticompetitive conduct:
Horizontal conspiracies or boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other
economic advantages from the government would be immunized on the ground
that they are genuinely intended to influence the government to agree to the
conspirators' terms. Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal
output restrictions on the ground that they are intended to dramatize the
plight of their industry and spur legislative action. Immunity might even be
claimed for anticompetitive mergers on the theory that they give the merging
corporations added political clout.
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 503-04.
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CLAIMS OF NOERR IMMUNITY
decide whether Allied Tube's conduct amounted to a valid effort to
influence the government. According to the majority, that determina-
tion "depends . . . on the context and nature of the activity.' 144 The
appropriate context in Allied Tube was the private standard-setting
association. Although the standard-setting process at the NFPA de-
pended on the voting of the membership, the Court refused to equate
those procedures with legislative decisionmaking. 145 The Court's deci-
sion that the NFPA is not a quasi-legislative body seems to compel
this conclusion. Furthermore, the distinction between petitioning legis-
latures and petitioning other agencies is not new. The Court first drew
the distinction in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlim-
ited,146 rejecting the notion that conduct protected in the legislative
arena by Noerr was necessarily protected when directed toward other
governmental units.
[U]nethical conduct in the setting of the adjudicatory process often
results in sanctions. Perjury of witnesses is one example. Use of a pat-
ent obtained by fraud to exclude a competitor from the market may
involve a violation of the antitrust laws .... Conspiracy with a li-
censing authority to eliminate a competitor may also result in an anti-
trust transgression....
There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice
which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which
may result in antitrust violations. Misrepresentations, condoned in
the political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory
process.. . . Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes are in-
volved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking ref-
uge under the umbrella of "political expression.
'147
It is difficult to understand why unethical tactics should be tolerated
when the petitioning activity is aimed directly at a private organization
if they are not tolerated, at least in some instances, when petitioning
activity is directed at government. Yet this is precisely what Noerr per-
mits. The allegedly unethical practice in Noerr-use of the third-party
technique-was a form of petitioning aimed not at a governmental
body but at the general public. Therefore, the use of deceptive or un-
144. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 504.
145. Id.
146. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
147. Id. at 512-13. Several commentators have argued that the distinction between
protection given to conduct in an adjudicatory context and that given to conduct in a
legislative context is unsupported. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 41, at 98-100. Professor
Fischel's argument is based upon his belief that Noerr and its progeny rest on the first
amendment. He correctly notes that some unethical conduct is subject to regulation and
prohibition even in the legislative arena. Id. at 99. For example, perjury before a legisla-
tive committee is subject to prohibition. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
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ethical tactics alone cannot distinguish Allied Tube's conduct before
the NFPA from the railroads' activities in Noerr.
Nor can any distinction rest solely on the difference between harm
resulting directly from petitioning activity and harm resulting from
governmental action taken in response to the petitioning.'4" This dis-
tinction is largely addressed at the initial inquiry considering the
source of the restraint. 149 Moreover, it was rejected by the Noerr Court
itself as a sufficient basis for separating protected petitioning from un-
protected petitioning. In Noerr the trucking companies argued that
apart from any governmental action, the railroads' petitioning had
caused them competitive injury.15° Specifically, they claimed that the
railroads' publicity campaign had damaged their relationships with
some customers.' 5' The Noerr Court, however, dismissed such direct
injury as an "inevitable" and "incidental" consequence of the petition-
ing conduct.152 While Allied Tube makes clear that there are limits to
this doctrine, the Court's solution works within this branch of Noerr
rather than wholly abandoning it. Those limits are defined not by the
source of the injury but by the "validity" of the petitioner's
activities. 53
Allied Tube is distinguishable from Noerr because "the context
and nature of [Allied Tube's] activity ma[d]e it the type of commercial
activity that has traditionally had its validity determined by the anti-
trust laws themselves."'1 54 This focus on the "context and nature" of
the anticompetitive activity requires the lower courts to draw fine dis-
tinctions between different but admittedly genuine attempts to influ-
ence governmental action. Although the majority recognized this
point,155 it nevertheless offered several factors to distinguish the com-
148. But see Calkins, supra note 50, at 341-44 (arguing that distinction between
direct and indirect harm distinguishes Allied Tube from other cases in Noerr line).
149. While generally advocating the distinction between direct and indirect harm,
Professor Calkins admits that "inquiry into whether a restraint is 'incidental' to 'valid'
petitioning arises only when harm has been caused directly by petitioning." See id. at
343. This merely restates the distinction between governmental restraints and private
restraints that supposedly separate absolute immunity under Noerr from qualified
immunity.




153. This is not to suggest that direct injury plays no role in analyzing claims of
Noerr immunity. The point is that the antitrust plaintiff must show something more
than direct injury. Direct injury may be a necessary element for overcoming the Noerr
defense, as some courts have said, see Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Con-
tractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 376 (7th Cir. 1987), but it alone is not sufficient.
154. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 505 (1988).
155. See id. at 507 n.10. The Court said:
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mercial activity in Allied Tube from the political activity in Noerr.
First, the Court noted that Allied Tube's petitioning of the NFPA
"did not take place in the open political arena, where partisanship is
the hallmark of decisionmaking, but within the confines of a private
standard-setting process.' 15 Private standard-setting associations have
long been subjected to antitrust scrutiny.' In fact, the Court sug-
gested that petitioning within private standard-setting organizations
may be held to more rigorous antitrust standards than petitioning
aimed at governmental bodies or the public at large. 58 Such organiza-
tions are classic antitrust conspiracies; their members often compete
against one another or stand in a dealer-supplier relationship. They are
tolerated under the antitrust laws "only on the understanding that
[they] will [conduct their business] in a nonpartisan manner offering
procompetitive benefits . . . ."159 This framework, the Court con-
cluded, distinguished the case from Noerr. Noerr had turned in part
on two points: (1) the extreme caution with which Congress has tradi-
tionally regulated petitioning; and (2) the "essential dissimilarity" be-
tween the'railroads' petitioning activity and activity normally held vio-
lative of the Sherman Act.16 0 Neither concern applied in Allied Tube.
It is admittedly difficult to draw the precise lines separating anticompetitive
political activity that is immunized despite its commercial impact from an-
ticompetitive commercial activity that is unprotected despite its political im-
pact, and this is itself a case close to the line. For that reason we caution that
our decision today depends on the context and nature of the activity.
Id.
156. Id. at 506.
157. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556 (1982) (standard-setting organization held liable under Sherman Act for actions of
its agent taken within the scope of his apparent authority); see also FTC v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (nonprofit trade association of dentists held sub-
ject to cease and desist order of FTC for antitrust violations); Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (nonprofit organization held liable for
Sherman Act violations).
158. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 507 ("[T]he standards of conduct in. . . [the private
standard-setting context] are, at least in some respects, more rigorous than the standards
of conduct prevailing in the partisan political arena or in the adversarial process of adju-
dication."). The Court's language is cryptic at best and can be characterized as dictum.
Nevertheless, the clear import is that some petitioning directed at a private standard-
setting organization may not be protected under Noerr, even though that same petition-
ing would be protected if conducted in a political arena or directed to an adjudicatory
body.
159. Id. at 506-07.
160. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136, 141 (1961). The "essential dissimilarity" reasoning has been attacked as contrary to
precedent. Fischel, supra note 41, at 83; see American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (Sherman Act condemns result of anticompetitive conduct, not form
of combination or means used). Fischel also argues that the Court's caution in imputing
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The activities within private standard-setting groups are precisely the
type of business conduct that traditionally falls within the Sherman
Act. Furthermore, the Court has never held that conduct otherwise
proscribed by the Sherman Act is immune from sanction simply be-
cause it has a speech component.'61
Second, Allied Tube's conduct went beyond mere petitioning. The
Court distinguished the railroads' petitioning in Noerr as "mere solici-
tation"16 2 to persuade an independent decisionmaker. Allied Tube,
however, "orchestrated the actual exercise of the Association's deci-
sionmaking authority in setting a standard."'' 3 Given the Court's em-
to Congress intent to regulate petitioning activity is unpersuasive unless that petitioning
is protected by the first amendment. See Fischel, supra note 41, at 77. Fischel, however,
misses the point of the American Tobacco holding. The issue in American Tobacco was
whether the evidence warranted a jury finding that an agreement existed among ciga-
rette manufacturers to monopolize the market. American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 809-10.
There was no dispute, however, that the resulting monopolization was illegal. By con-
trast, Noerr involved no attempt by the railroads to boycott the truckers. The question
in Noerr was not, as it was in American Tobacco, whether an agreement existed among
the alleged antitrust conspirators. The railroads admitted the agreement. Noerr, 365 U.S.
at 131. The sole question was whether the conduct resulting from that agreement consti-
tuted an unreasonable restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Id. at
131-33. Accordingly, the Court properly refrained from reaching the first amendment
question. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(discussing when Court will not pass upon constitutional questions and noting that Court
will not even pass upon a properly presented constitutional question if the case can be
disposed of on other grounds).
Fischel also points out that when Congress passed the Sherman Act, it intended to
exercise all of its constitutional authority to regulate trade restraints. Fischel, supra note
41, at 77. While this statement is technically correct, it cannot be understood in an his-
torical vacuum. When the Sherman Act became law in 1890, the prevailing conception of
congressional authority under the commerce clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, was
much narrower than it is today. Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895) (manufacturing held not to be commerce) with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (commerce clause gives Congress authority to regulate purely intrastate activity
that may have substantial impact on interstate commerce). Since the "jurisdictional"
reach of the Sherman Act is necessarily circumscribed by constitutional limitations on
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, congressional intent to exercise
its full constitutional authority in 1890 cannot be equated with an intent to exercise the
full constitutional authority that the post-New Deal conception of the commerce clause
might allow. Although the Supreme Court has subsequently allowed the reach of the
Sherman Act to expand along with the judicial conception of the commerce power, see
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976), the Court has never
made that expansion coextensive with the reach of the commerce clause. In fact, this is
one of the primary teachings of the Court's preemption and state action cases. See, e.g.,
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (Sherman Act does not preempt all incon-
sistent state regulation); Rice v. Norman Williams Co, 458 U.S. 654 (1982) (same).
161. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
162. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
163. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 507.
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phasis on this point, it is perhaps the crucial factor in the case. The
Court's interpretation, however, is only partially correct. Allied Tube
and other steel manufacturers controlled the votes of 230 new mem-
bers of the NFPA; these new members were enrolled solely to oppose
the inclusion of PVC conduit in the NEC and were instructed how to
vote on that proposal by Allied Tube's agents.""4 Nevertheless, the
steel interests defeated the PVC plank by a scant four votes, 394-
390.165 Although the steel interests would not have prevailed absent
their enrollment and control of the new members, it is clear that they
alone could not have prevailed without some support from a substan-
tial, and apparently independent, minority of the NFPA membership.
Even without the votes of Allied Tube's recruited members, nearly
thirty percent of the remaining membership voted against Indian
Head's proposal to include PVC in the NEC. The record does not indi-
cate that these votes were motivated by any anticompetitive purpose
or were otherwise tainted.
The Allied Tube majority glossed over these facts with little ap-
parent concern for their effect on the NFPA's actual decision-making
process. The clear implication is that an "economically interested
party"'6' 6 may exercise decision-making authority in a private stan-
dard-setting organization even when that party does not have enough
votes to sway the outcome by itself.16 7 Without offering any clear com-
ment on when and to what extent the Sherman Act limits an economi-
cally interested party's participation in a standard-setting associa-
tion, 68 the Court said that such parties remain "free to take advantage
164. Id. at 497.
165. Id.
166. With little elaboration, the Court described Allied Tube as an "economically
interested party." Id. at 504. This term is as malleable as the term "decisionmaking."
Perhaps like obscenity, it cannot be defined but the Court "know[s] it when [it] see[s]
it." See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). It may
mean nothing more than "competitor" or a party with some clear economic incentive to
restrain trade in the affected market. Yet the Court gave no explanation as to why it
would limit the definition to such parties.
167. Perhaps this result can be rationalized by the doctrine of proximate causation.
Normally one need not be the sole cause of injury to be liable. PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF ToRTs §§ 46-52 (5th ed. 1984). The conduct of the steel interests combined
with the lawful conduct of other NFPA members proximately caused Indian Head's
injury.
168. The Court also granted certiorari to decide whether Allied Tube's conduct, if
not protected by Noerr, constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. The Court va-
cated the writ of certiorari on that question as improvident. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499
n.3. The Court noted, however, that at one point Allied Tube's literal compliance with
the NFPA's rules did not relieve it of antitrust liability. It then added, "An association
cannot validate the anticompetitive activities of its members simply by adopting rules
that fail to provide ... safeguards [against anticompetitive activity]. The issue of immu-
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of the forum provided by the standard-setting process by presenting
and vigorously arguing accurate scientific evidence before a nonparti-
san private standard-setting body." 169 Allied Tube thus leaves open
the possibility that petitioning of private standard-setting associations
will be protected by Noerr only if the petitioning party does not other-
wise participate in the standard-setting process.
17 0
More likely, however, the benefits of the code-drafting process in
bodies such as the NFPA will lead the Court to adopt a more indulgent
rule. The steel interests' conduct at the NFPA appears to be predomi-
nantly an exercise of business judgment. Although Allied Tube did
have some concern about the safety of PVC conduit, its primary moti-
vation appears to have been, or at least the jury so found, to protect its
market position by excluding potential competitors from the market.
This is certainly a defensible conclusion based on the facts of the case.
If the steel interests had truly been motivated by the potential safety
risks posed by PVC conduit, one would expect that at least some of the
new members they enrolled would have had the technical data to fol-
low and participate in the debate at the NFPA meeting. Instead, it
appears that Allied Tube merely recruited a number of people simply
to attend the meeting and vote as instructed by the steel interests.
That these new members also had a financial stake in the outcome of
the vote also points to the conclusion that business interests rather
than the public interest lay behind Allied Tube's petitioning activities.
Perhaps the exercise of business judgment coupled with the in-
tended direct injury to competitors provides a sufficient basis for dis-
tinguishing protected petitioning from unprotected decisionmaking 7 1
nity in this case thus collapses into the issue of antitrust liability." Id. at 509 (footnote
omitted). The Court immediately retreated from this statement, however, saying that it
was not "set[ting] forth the rules of antitrust liability governing the private standard-
setting process .... ." Id. at 509-10.
169. Id. at 510 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
170, See id. The dissent certainly read the majority opinion this way. It defined the
term "decisionmaking authority" as "voting" and criticized the majority approach for
interposing an antitrust standard on the internal workings of standard-setting associa-
tions. See id. at 515-16 (White, J., dissenting). This reading of the term "decisionmaking
authority" seems too broad. Cf. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, T 206.2, at
879 n.11 (dissent's suggestion that voting within majority's stricture against exercising
"decisionmaking authority" is perhaps too hasty).
The majority did note that Allied Tube could "avoid the strictures of the private
standard-setting process by attempting to influence legislatures through other forums."
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 510. This language also implies that the standards for Noerr
immunity are more rigorous when applied in the private standard-setting context than in
the legislative or adjudicatory arena. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
171. Of course, Pennington makes clear that even petitioning motivated by an-
ticompetitive purposes is protected by Noerr. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965). One can perhaps assume that most business judgments are
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Of course, such inquiries into subjective motivation often present diffi-
cult problems of proof. Juries may resolve conflicting evidence against
the petitioner even when the petitioner is motivated primarily by legit-
imate public concerns. If Noerr immunity is to offer real protection for
presentation of scientific evidence in the drafting of model codes, as-
sociations must be given the latitude to fashion voting procedures con-
ducive to efficient and reliable code-drafting. Otherwise, Noerr immu-
nity in this area will be nothing more than a surrogate for a set of
"rules of antitrust liability governing the private standard-setting pro-
cess."' 7 2 The risk of inquiring into the subjective motivation of the pe-
titioner is that it may deter presentation of precisely the type of relia-
ble scientific evidence that makes the drafting of model codes useful in
the first instance. 173 Unfortunately, Allied Tube leaves the limits of
made with an eye toward preserving or increasing a firm's market share. But in Allied
Tube there is more. There is business judgment, unfiltered by government review, and a
direct competitive injury flowing from that business judgment. The lower courts have
often used a similar approach in analyzing Noerr claims. See, e.g., Litton Sys. v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1983) (decision to impose anticompetitive
tariff conceived in AT&T boardroom and did not result from regulation), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1073 (1984). The Supreme Court's latest discussion of Noerr also suggests that
an exercise of business judgment that causes direct injury is not immune under Noerr.
See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990) (restraint which is
means of obtaining legislation rather than consequence of legislation not immune under
Noerr). The Court has also used a similar analysis when determining whether a federal
regulatory program repeals the antitrust laws by implication. See, e.g., National Ger-
imedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 390 (1981) (implied
repeal especially disfavored when antitrust implications of a business decision not con-
sidered by a governmental entity). Since the Noerr doctrine's practical operation differs
little from an implied repeal, one would expect that direct injuries flowing from a busi-
ness judgment would be viewed under the normal antitrust lens.
172. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509. The Court stated that "[t]he issue of immunity in
this case ... collapses into the issue of antitrust liability." Id. This language is unfortu-
nate for two reasons. First, in one sense, it states a truism in all antitrust cases in which
a claim for Noerr immunity is denied. The lack of Noerr immunity does not mean that a
party has committed an antitrust violation but only that the validity of its conduct must
be judged under traditional antitrust standards. One case vividly illustrates the point. In
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), the court held that Noerr does not protect attempts to
influence the government to make certain purchases. This case gave rise to the so-called
commercial exception to the Noerr doctrine. See Fischel, supra note 41, at 115-18; Hur-
witz, supra note 79, at 82-87. Four years later, the First Circuit held that even if the
defendant's conduct was unprotected by Noerr, it did not constitute an antitrust viola-
tion. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). Second, even if the language is meant only to
apply to standard-setting organizations, it clearly conflicts with the Court's assertion
that Noerr immunity might apply to those situations in which a party does nothing more
than vigorously argue accurate scientific evidence in front of a code-drafting body.
173. The problem with excessive deterrence in the antitrust context is that it does
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permissible petitioning in the private standard-setting context unclear.
C. Noerr and the First Amendment
As a final step in its analysis, the Allied Tube majority distin-
guished the case before it from the holding in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co. 17 4 Claiborne Hardware did not involve the federal anti-
trust laws, but arose instead from a state tort action. In the mid-1960s
the NAACP organized a boycott of white merchants in Claiborne
County, Mississippi. The boycott was designed to make both govern-
ment and business comply with its demands for racial equality. In
many respects, the boycott was a typical form of protest during the
civil rights movement. The white merchants of the county filed suit
claiming that the NAACP's actions in enforcing the boycott consti-
tuted tortious activity under state law.175 Many of these enforcement
efforts amounted to nothing more than social ostracism of those blacks
who failed to comply with boycott, coupled with vague, unspecific
threats. Some of the measures, however, involved violence. 17 6 After
years of protracted litigation, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed
an award of damages to the merchants.17 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the first amendment protected the nonvi-
olent elements of the boycott and its enforcement.
178
Although the Claiborne Hardware decision cited Noerr, it rested
squarely on first amendment grounds. 7 " The Allied Tube Court, how-
ever, did not expressly distinguish the case on that point. Instead, it
noted that
the boycott [in Claiborne Hardware] was not motivated by any desire
to lessen competition or to reap economic benefits but by the aim of
vindicating rights of equality and freedom lying at the heart of the
Constitution, and the boycotters were consumers who did not stand to
profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted
market.180
not "redound to the public's benefit." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 442 n.17 (1978). It deters conduct that is not only legal but also socially desira-
ble. "The antitrust laws differ in this regard from, for example laws designed to insure
that adulterated food will not be sold to consumers. In the latter situation, excessive
caution on the part of producers is entirely consistent with the legislative purpose." Id.
174. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
175. Id. at 889-90.
176. Id. at 904-05.
177. Id. at 894.
178. Id. at 928-29.
179. Id. at 913-14.
180. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 (1988).
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The Court also pointed out that Allied Tube "was at least partially
motivated by the desire to lessen competition, and . . stood to reap
substantial economic benefits from making it difficult for [Indian
Head] to compete."18 1 This distinction seems irrelevant in light of prior
decisions. The Noerr Court had rejected an argument that the rail-
roads' desire to injure their trucking competition subjected the activity
to antitrust scrutiny.18 2 The Pennington Court was even more explicit,
holding that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort
to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose."183 Justice
White's dissenting opinion in Allied Tube also made reference to this
inconsistency.1
8 4
The majority's distinction of Claiborne Hardware goes to the core
question posed by the Noerr doctrine: whether the doctrine rests on a
construction of the Sherman Act or is mandated by the petitioning
clause of the first amendment. The key to unraveling the apparent in-
consistency and reconciling the distinctions among Allied Tube, Clai-
borne Hardware, Noerr, and Pennington lies buried in an Allied Tube
footnote: "Although the absence of such anticompetitive motives and
incentives is relevant to determining whether [Allied Tube's] restraint
of trade is protected under Claiborne Hardware, we do not suggest
that the absence of anticompetitive purpose is necessary for Noerr im-
munity."'11 5 This statement suggests a clear dividing line between the
scope of protection afforded petitioning activity under the Noerr doc-
trine and the scope of protection afforded that same activity by the
first amendment. Petitioning with an anticompetitive purpose is appar-
ently, in some instances, not protected by the first amendment. Never-
theless, both Noerr and Pennington make clear that the same petition-
ing is not condemned by the Sherman Act for that reason alone. If
Allied Tube stands for this proposition, then it implies that the Noerr
doctrine is rooted in construction of the Sherman Act and does not rest
solely on the first amendment.'8 6 The use of the "essential dissimilar-
181. Id. at 509.
182. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
142-43 (1961).
183. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
184. See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. 512-13 (White, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 509 n.11.
186. Professor Calkins notes that by referring to Noerr as conferring "immunity"
from antitrust scrutiny, the Allied Tube Court was perhaps implying that the doctrine's
undeniable constitutional roots are preeminent. Calkins, supra note 50, at 345-46. This is
not Calkins' preferred interpretation, see id. at 346 n.96, nor does it consider the distinc-
tion the Court drew between Claiborne Hardware and Noerr. Professor Calkins, how-
ever, is surely correct in noting that defining the Noerr doctrine as a creature of statu-
tory construction, rather than as a determination that the Sherman Act is
unconstitutional as applied in some cases, would not automatically require rejection of
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ity" rationale advanced by the Noerr Court to distinguish between po-
litical and commercial activity also supports this conclusion .
7
Still further support can be found in the Court's latest discussion
of Noerr. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association8 s the
Court held that a concerted refusal by a group of private criminal at-
torneys to accept appointments under the District of Columbia's Crim-
inal Justice Act (CJA)189 was not protected by Noerr. The lawyers had
refused to take the cases of indigent defendants in the hope
of-depending upon how one views the boycott-persuading or coerc-
ing the D.C. City Council to raise the hourly fees of attorneys who ac-
cept CJA appointments. Although the parties had briefed the Noerr
issue extensively, the Court dismissed the claim in three short
paragraphs.8 0 Nevertheless, it noted that Noerr "[i]nterpret[ed] the
Sherman Act in light of the First Amendment's Petition Clause."''M
The Court's discussion of Noerr was, at most, a passing reference in its
more general inquiry into the lawfulness of the lawyers' boycott. But
since the lawyers also raised a separate first amendment claim, which
the Court treated in detail in another section of its opinion, Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Association can be read as returning the Noerr
doctrine to its roots: a statutory construction with an eye on constitu-
tional concerns.
Of course, if this is what the Court means, it has not said so. Thus,
although the Allied Tube Court has begun the process of defining a
conceptual framework for analyzing claims of Noerr immunity, the
framework is incomplete. The crucial question of the doctrine's foun-
dation has not been clearly answered. Even though Allied Tube and
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association suggest a resolution, such
extrapolation is a poor substitute for a fully developed opinion on the
matter.1 '
those decisions holding that the first amendment compelled antitrust immunity for cer-
tain petitioning conduct. See id.
187. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 507.
188. 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
189. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2601 to -2609 (1981).
190. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 776. The Court's decision on
this point was unanimous although three Justices dissented from the Court's ruling on
the liability issue.
191. Id.
192. See Calkins, supra note 50, at 346 (noting that question of whether Noerr doc-
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D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justices White and O'Connor dissented in Allied Tube. They took
exception to the majority's application of the Noerr doctrine, but of-
fered no real alternative other than a different view of the sham excep-
tion.19 3 The dissent argued that the case "present[ed] an even stronger
argument for immunity than did Noerr itself.'1 94 It read Noerr as
turning solely on whether the petitioner genuinely sought to obtain the
enactment or enforcement of laws. Since the majority conceded that
Allied Tube's petitioning was genuinely designed to influence the con-
tent of state and local fire codes, that concession, in the dissent's view,
disposed of the case. 195 The principal strength of Allied Tube's argu-
ment, the dissent said, was that the NFPA actually drafted proposed
legislation and presented it nationwide. 96 It contrasted these legisla-
tive efforts with the railroads' "diluted attempt to move public opin-
ion" through the broad publicity campaign in Noerr.19
7
The dissent also objected to the majority's reliance on the "con-
text and nature" of the petitioning activity to determine the scope of
immunity under Noerr.9 8 This disagreement, however, amounts to lit-
tle more than a semantic war. There is no dispute that the breadth of
Noerr immunity varies with the arena in which the petitioning is con-
ducted. In fact, Justice White chastised the majority for not developing
its reasoning fully. "No workable boundaries to the Noerr doctrine are
established," he wrote, "by declaring, and then repeating at every turn,
that everything depends on 'the context and nature of the activity' if
we are unable to offer any further guidance about what this vague ref-
erence is supposed to mean . . . ."199 Such malleable standards, he
concluded, will leave the lower federal courts without any direction
about how to apply the Noerr doctrine.
Finally, the dissent objected to the decision on policy grounds, ar-
guing that it will hamper the standard-setting process in a number of
code-drafting bodies. °0 Justice White noted that some 400 private or-
ganizations prepare and publish various codes and product standards
193. See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 511-16 (White, J., dissenting); see also infra notes
210-30 and accompanying text (examining various applications and definitions of the
sham exception).




198. Id. at 513.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 513-14.
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nationwide. 01 The majority's decision, he concluded, will chill partici-
pation in drafting meetings and deprive both the local governments
and the public of the benefits of industry self-regulation of health and
safety standards.
20 2
The dissent's policy objections are unpersuasive. Blanket immu-
nity for participation in the code-drafting process would effectively
preclude antitrust scrutiny of a segment of a standard-setting associa-
tion's activities. Specifically, that conduct which is, at least in part,
genuinely designed to influence governmental action would be immune
without regard to its nongovernmental consequences. The logical im-
plication of this reasoning is that Noerr not only immunizes the sub-
mission of model codes to state and local legislative bodies, but also
immunizes the antecedent conduct that crafts the model codes. Al-
though this is a conceivable position, it fails to take account of the
Court's prior decisions which suggest a contrary result.0
The dissent's concerns about the effect of Allied Tube on the stan-
dard-setting process can largely be obviated by fashioning appropriate
rules of antitrust liability for standard-setting organizations. Although
the majority refused to consider or establish any such rules, it noted
that the "issue of immunity in this case . . . collapses into the issue of
antitrust liability. '20 4 While the import of this statement is not clear, it
apparently means that members of a private standard-setting organiza-
tion do not have antitrust immunity merely by complying with the let-
ter of the organization's rules.20 5 The dissent takes no issue with this
point. It would, nevertheless, confer immunity on the petitioning con-
duct genuinely intended to influence government in order to avoid an-
titrust litigation in the first instance.2 0 8 Again, this concern could be
201. Id. at 514.
202. Id. at 516.
203. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (holding that State of
Georgia may obtain injunctive relief against railroad conspiracy to fix rates to be submit-
ted to the Interstate Commerce Commission); cf. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs,
Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982) (noting that private standard-setting
organizations are rife with opportunities for anticompetitive activity). To his credit, Jus-
tice White is consistent; he dissented in both Hydrolevel and Allied Tube. The dissent in
Hydrolevel, however, was not based on the conclusion that the conduct at issue did not
amount to a violation of the antitrust laws. Instead, the dissent focused on the Court's
holding that a standard-setting association could be liable under the Sherman Act for
the conduct of its agents acting within the scope of their apparent authority. Id. at 579
(Powell, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in
Hydrolevel, joined the majority in Allied Tube. Justice O'Connor, on the other hand,
dissented in Allied Tube although she had been in the majority in Hydrolevel.
204. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509.
205. See id. For a criticism of this language, see supra note 172.
206. See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 514 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote:
It must inevitably be the case that codes such as [the National Electric Code]
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alleviated by fashioning appropriate rules of antitrust liability that ad-
equately reflect the potential procompetitive benefits such organiza-
tions may provide.
Extending Noerr immunity might indeed provide a basis for more
speedy resolution of those suits that are filed, perhaps at the summary
judgment stage. But this argument loses much of its force in light of
recent developments. The Court's willingness to allow summary judg-
ment more readily in antitrust suits20 7 offers a similar vehicle for quick
disposition of those claims under traditional liability standards. More-
over, as noted below, °0 the dissent's solution for curbing petitioning
abuses in standard-setting organizations (i.e., expansion of the sham
exception) belies its argument that potential antitrust litigation will
chill industry participation in the code-drafting process.
In short, aside from its views on the sham exception, the dissent
had little disagreement with the analytical framework for Noerr claims
erected by the Allied Tube majority. Although the dissent quibbled
with application of those rules to the facts at issue, the substantive
theory supporting its position differed little from the majority's.20 9
E. The Sham Exception
The central disagreement between the majority and the dissent in
Allied Tube arose over the breadth of Noerr's so-called "sham excep-
tion." As originally conceived by the Noerr Court, the sham exception
embraced petitioning "ostensibly directed toward influencing govern-
mental action . . .[that is] nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor. '210 Although
this language seemingly limits the sham exception to anticompetitive
activity carried out under the ruse of petitioning, after California Mo-
tor Transport the lower courts developed a practice of finding certain
will set standards that some products cannot satisfy and hence in the name of
health and safety will reduce or prevent competition, as was the case here. Yet,
putative competitors of the producer of such products will now think twice
before urging in the course of the code-making process that those products not
be approved; for if they are successful (or even if they are not), they may well
become antitrust defendants facing treble-damages liability ....
Id.
207. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Again,
to his credit, Justice White is consistent; he wrote the dissenting opinion in Matsushita.
See id. at 598 (White, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, however, was with the majority
in that case.
208. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
209. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, § 206.2, at 873-77.
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genuine but unethical petitioning conduct, such as misrepresentation,
within Noerr's sham exception.
211
Perhaps the broadest reading of the sham exception came in Ses-
sions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Manufacturing, Inc.,21 2 a Ninth Circuit
decision rendered shortly after the Second Circuit's opinion in Allied
Tube. Sessions merits some attention because its facts closely parallel
those of Allied Tube. Joor Manufacturing, a maker of underground
storage tanks for hazardous fluids, successfully petitioned the Western
Fire Chiefs Association (WFCA) to amend its model fire code to ex-
clude a tank repair process developed by Sessions. The WFCA code,
much like the NEC, is quite influential; many county and municipal
governments in the western United States routinely adopt it as law.2 1 3
Furthermore, like the NFPA, the WFCA is a nongovernmental body.
Its voting membership, however, is limited exclusively to public offi-
cials who enforce fire safety regulations. Unlike the NFPA, it has no
voting members who have a clear economic interest in the contents of
the model code.
21'4
The dispute was over an exclusionary tactic concerning a repair
process for leaking underground storage tanks. When a tank leaked,
Sessions repaired it by puncturing the tank while still in the ground
and coating the inner surface with an epoxy lining. Joor contended
that this process could not detect corrosion which might have caused
the leaking. It argued that aboveground inspection was necessary to
determine whether the leaking tanks could continue to withstand
ground pressure. Because exhuming a tank is expensive, most busi-
nesses will buy new tanks if the underground repair process is not
available.1 5
In 1978 Joor's president became a member of a subcommittee as-
signed to revise the WFCA's code provisions governing the use and
storage of inflammable fluids. In subcommittee meetings he argued vig-
211. See, e.g., Greenwood Utils. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484,
1505 n.14 (5th Cir. 1985) (filing of false information with administrative body falls within
sham exception); Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (sham
exception governs petitioning that impairs fair and impartial functioning of administra-
tive agency). Several commentators concurred in this view. See P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, 206.2, at 75 (Noerr protection denied to petitioning of
private bodies which involves clearly 'improper conduct; "sham" simply term of art
describing petitioning that is not worth protecting); Fischel, supra note 41, at 106 (sham
exception should encompass all petitioning activity unprotected by the first amend-
ment); Hurwitz, supra note 79, at 109 (noting that certain unethical or illegal conduct
should fall within sham exception).
212. 827 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2862 (1988).
213. Id. at 460 n.1.
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orously that underground tank lining should be completely prohibited.
The subcommittee eventually adopted that proposal unanimously, and
the WFCA governing body wrote the subcommittee's recommendation
into its code in 1982.216
Sessions then filed claims under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. Joor Manufacturing raised "Noerr as a defense, and the district
court granted it summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed nearly
every aspect of the lower court's order.217 It disagreed with the Second
Circuit's conclusion that Noerr immunity could not protect petitioning
within a standard-setting association. 18 Instead, it held Noerr applica-
ble to Joor's petitioning and immediately turned to the sham excep-
tion. It also refused to confine its definition of sham petitioning to
those instances in which a party does not genuinely seek to influence
governmental action. According to the Sessions court, the sham excep-
tion extends to those cases "in which the defendant genuinely seeks to
achieve his governmental result, but does so through improper
means."21 The court reasoned that such improper petitioning could be
a sham because the petitioner made "a pretense of seeking an indepen-
dent, impartial decision.
'220
Whatever the merits of this broad interpretation of the sham ex-
ception, the Supreme Court rejected it in Allied Tube. Without elabo-
ration, the majority noted that the Ninth Circuit's approach "distorts
[the] meaning [of the word 'sham'] and bears little relation to the
sham exception Noerr described to cover activity that was not genu-
inely intended to influence governmental action." '221 The dissent en-
dorsed the Sessions approach, but offered no reasoning to support its
position other than a conclusory assertion that the sham exception is
"enough to guard against flagrant [petitioning] abuse[s]" in standard-
setting associations.222
The dissent's failure to develop its reasoning fully is inexplicable.
The Sessions court had admitted its agreement with the Second Cir-
cuit's result in Allied Tube. Instead of holding the conduct outside No-
216. Id. at 461.
217. The Ninth Circuit held that Sessions' allegation that Joor had made misrepre-
sentations concerning the tank lining process to some local fire officials stated a claim
under Noerr's sham exception. Id. at 468. Accordingly, it reversed the district court on
this point and remanded the case for trial on this claim alone. Id. at 469. Since this was a
relatively minor aspect of the complaint, the reversal was at best a Pyrrhic victory for
Sessions.
218. Id. at 465.
219. Id. at 465 n.5 (emphasis in original).
220. Id. (citing Hurwitz, supra note 79, at 109).
221. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 507 n.10
(1988).
222. Id. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
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err's protection, however, it would have reached that result by declar-
ing it an unprotected sham 2 3 Justice White's dissent made no
mention of this fact. It labelled Allied Tube's conduct an "occasional
abuse" 224 of the standard-setting process, but denied that such abuse
"render[ed] the entire process less useful and reliable. ' 2 5 This state-
ment perhaps harkens back to the California Motor Transport deci-
sion in which the Court held that a pattern of baseless and repetitive
claims constituted sham petitioning.22 The dissent's failure to fully de-
223. Sessions, 827 F.2d at 466 (noting that Allied Tube's conduct "constitutes ex-
actly the kind of abuse of process that the 'sham' exception to Noerr-Pennington serves
to weed out"); see also Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 507 n.10 (commenting on Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Sessions).
224. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515
(1972). The Court has never indicated whether the sham exception is triggered by a sin-
gle petitioning abuse. Perhaps the closest it has come to addressing the issue is Vendo
Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977). In Vendo a divided Court held that sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988), does not constitute an express excep-
tion to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), and thus does not permit a
federal court to enjoin a state court proceeding that the antitrust plaintiff alleges consti-
tutes sham petitioning. The Vendo plurality, Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Powell,
stated that California Motor Transport "may be cited for the proposition that repeti-
tive, sham litigation in state courts may constitute an antitrust violation and that an
injunction may lie to enjoin future state-court litigation." Vendo, 433 U.S. at 635 n.6.
Later the plurality observed that the federal antitrust plaintiff could set up his antitrust
claim as a defense to the state court litigation or bring a treble damages action for injury
"resulting from the vexatious prosecution of that state court litigation." Id. at 636 n.6.
Although this language suggests that the plurality would permit a damage action against
a single sham suit, see Hurwitz, supra note 79, at 100 n.155, the issue is not clear. Justice
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the Vendo result. They would have
allowed injunctions against pending state suits that were "part of a 'pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims' that are being used as an anticompetitive device." Vendo, 433 U.S. at
644 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In dissent, Justices Stevens, Brennan, White, and Mar-
shall argued that California Motor Transport prohibited even a single instance of sham
petitioning and thus justified injunction of a pending state proceeding. Id. at 661-62
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The fact that Justice White joined the Vendo dissent makes it
unlikely that he would require a pattern of petitioning abuses to trigger the sham
exception.
Since Vendo, several cases have held that a single petitioning abuse constitutes a
sham. See, e.g, Omni Resource Dev. Corp. v. Conoco, Inc., 739 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1984);
Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Colorado Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. South-
land Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979). But see Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co.
v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1985); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691
F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982) (pattern of baseless claims required to trigger sham exception),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 904 (1983); Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co.,
428 F. Supp. 951 (D. Conn. 1977) (multiple petitioning abuses required to trigger sham
exception). Several commentators also believe that a single petitioning abuse is sufficient
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velop its reasoning, however, makes this speculation at best.
The majority's limitation of the sham exception alters the basic
framework of the Noerr doctrine as it has developed in the lower fed-
eral courts. Under the Sessions court's broad construction, claims of
Noerr immunity largely depended on the applicability of the sham ex-
ception. One commentator has labeled this the "exception-to-the-ex-
emption analysis. 221 7 Under it the courts presume that the petitioning
conduct falls within the protection of Noerr and then apply an expan-
sive sham exception to determine if the Noerr shield should be with-
drawn.22 This practice is precisely what the Allied Tube dissent advo-
cated. Yet this position is fundamentally at odds with the concern that
antitrust litigation hinders the standard-setting process. If petitioning
conduct is protected unless the sham exception applies, no antitrust
plaintiff would be discouraged from filing suit when a competitive ad-
versary uses marginal petitioning tactics. The plaintiff would simply
phrase the claim so that it falls within the sham exception. Thus, the
dissent's objection to the majority's focus on the "context and nature"
of the petitioning conduct as determinative of the applicability of No-
err must be rejected. Its alternative approach would render the sham
exception "no more than a label courts could apply to activity they
deem unworthy of antitrust immunity .... -229
Allied Tube effectively buries this approach without a drastic
change in result.23 Instead of treating sham petitioning as an excep-
tion which withdraws the protection of Noerr, it is more properly
viewed as an "invalid" effort to influence the government. Noerr im-
munity, therefore, is not withdrawn because it does not even reach the
conduct in the first instance. In some contexts, sham petitioning may
be the only form of "invalid" petitioning. The inquiry into sham con-
duct, however, does not turn on the tactics used by the petitioner but
on whether its conduct is genuinely intended to influence governmental
action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even if its contours are not clear, a framework for analyzing claims
of Noerr immunity has emerged from Allied Tube. This is a welcome
to constitute a sham. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, 203.1(e), at 24-
25; Fischel, supra note 41, at 109-10; Handler & DeSevo, The Noerr Doctrine and its
Sham Exception, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 28-30 (1984); Hurwitz, supra note 79, at 100-02.
227. Note, supra note 48, at 1311.
228. Id. at 1311-12.
229. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 n.10
(1988).
230. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, § 206.2, at 880-81.
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development after the Supreme Court's prolonged silence in this area.
Much unfinished work remains, however. If Noerr immunity is truly
absolute when the petitioner seeks and obtains a governmentally im-
posed restraint, then the Court should develop some guidelines for dis-
tinguishing governmental conduct from private conduct. The current
state action doctrine is well suited for this task. It provides a relatively
simple structure for ascertaining the sources of anticompetitive re-
straints and offers a workable standard in the Noerr context. In fact,
such a clear rule may help the lower courts dispose of many cases on
Noerr grounds without protracted litigation.
The Court also needs to clarify when private conduct that re-
strains trade will be deemed incidental to a valid petitioning effort and
therefore immune under Noerr. In the lexicon of Allied Tube, the
Court must establish some rules for determining when petitioning con-
duct is truly political activity rather than commercial activity being
conducted partially in the political arena. This will inevitably involve
some inquiry into the subjective motivations of the petitioner. The
task for the Court is to fashion rules that do not deter potentially ben-
eficial conduct while nevertheless making the full panoply of antitrust
sanctions available against the business actor who uses the political
arena for anticompetitive purposes that cause direct marketplace in-
jury, regardless of the result of the governmental action requested.
This will not be an easy chore.
Finally, the Allied Tube Court missed an opportunity to answer
perhaps the chief question lingering with the Noerr cases: the source of
Noerr immunity. Until the Court definitively decides whether Noerr is
a constitutional doctrine or, as Allied Tube and Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association suggest, a construction of the Sherman Act in-
formed by first amendment concerns, the details of the framework es-
tablished by Allied Tube will remain vague.
Yet even with its flaws Allied Tube is an important step in the
development of a rational Noerr doctrine. It is the first pronouncement
from the Supreme Court concerning the framework for analyzing
claims of antitrust immunity for petitioning activity. It also provides
the lower courts with a starting point for addressing the numerous is-
sues presented by Noerr claims. Having finally broken its silence in
this area, one can only hope that the Court will not wait another six-
teen years before adding another significant piece to the Noerr puzzle.
William L. Monts, III
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